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Informed public debate and evidence-based policy-making on immigration 
requires clarity and transparency about what we know and don’t know about 
migration and its impacts. This report sets out the ten most important problems 
in the evidence base on immigration and migrants in the UK. It is written 
and published by Oxford University’s new Migration Observatory (www.
migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk), a multimedia platform that provides independent, 
authoritative, strictly evidence based analysis to inform media, public and policy 
debates on international migration in the UK. 
How did we compile the list? 
Our assessment of what should be included in the list has been guided by the key issues in current public and policy 
debates on migration in the UK.  These include the mechanics and impacts of reducing overall net-migration to the 
tens of thousands through limiting non-EU immigration for work, study and family/marriage reasons, and through 
making it more difficult for migrants to settle permanently in the UK. The top ten data and analysis problems 
discussed in this report are all relevant to these issues.  Most of the problems we identify are quite specific but in 
areas where we have very little information (e.g. on irregular migration) they are more general. Although numbered 
for convenience, the problems are not ranked in order of importance. In the end, our list is necessarily subjective as 
different experts may identify slightly different issues. 
What do we mean by “problems in the evidence base”?    
The problems we identify arise from one or more of the following factors: data gaps and limitations; analysis 
gaps and limitations; and uncertainties in the conclusions emerging from the available analysis.  We are focusing 
on current problems and recognise that work is underway that aims to address some of the issues (e.g. the cross 
government Migration Statistics Improvement Programme, e-Borders, and the Census 2011). While all the 
problems we discuss can be alleviated by more and better data and/or analysis, it is important to emphasise that 
no country can be expected to have complete information about all the issues identified in this report. Collecting 
new data is costly. There are always tensions between the desire to collect new data or share existing data on the 
one hand, and privacy laws and concerns about data protection on the other. Some aspects of migration such as 
irregular migration are by their very nature much more difficult to measure and analyse than others e.g. legal labour 
immigration from outside Europe.  
 
The limits of “more and better evidence”
More and better evidence will strengthen the basis for public debate and policy-making on migration. It cannot, 
however, provide ready-made answers to migration policy questions which, in the end, always involve a balancing 
of competing impacts and interests. What policy should look like is an inherently political question that necessarily 
involves debates about the values that should guide policy-making in this area. In line with the mission of the 
Migration Observatory, the aim of this report is to inform and promote a stronger evidence base for debate, not to 
say what policy should be.      
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Summary
1) Emigration: The only source of information is a survey 
This creates significant uncertainties about estimates of the number of people emigrating and, by extension, net-
migration figures.  
2) Immigration: Data sources differ on numbers of migrants coming to the UK
The government collects data on inflows of migrants through three primary sources, which provide different 
estimates of total immigration. Although the three sources measure slightly different aspects of immigration, 
uncertainty remains about the reasons for the discrepancy. 
3) Net-migration: Different data sources suggest different figures 
Two major data sources (the International Passenger Survey and the Annual Population Survey) disagree about 
the level and changes of net-migration over time. This is a problem because reducing net-migration is a key policy 
objective of the current Government.  
4) The immigration status of migrants in the UK: No systematic data   
We have information about how many migrants enter the UK for work, study, asylum, or family reasons, but there is 
no systematic data measuring the immigration status of the stock of migrants in the UK. We therefore do not know 
the numbers and characteristics of migrants on different types of residence permits. Consequently, analyses of the 
impacts of policy changes that affect specific entry channels or groups of migrants are limited.   
5) Local area statistics on migrants: The existing estimates are very imprecise
The Census is the best source of demographic data for small geographical units but it happens only every ten years. 
In the intercensal period, the only data sources are surveys that yield very imprecise estimates of the size and 
characteristics of the migrant population at the local level.
6) Public opinion: How does the public define the “immigrants” it wants reduced?
Public opinion data clearly show that the majority of the British resident population would prefer reduced 
immigration. But the evidence base lacks detailed information on a crucial issue – how do members of the public 
define “immigrants?”
7) Migrants’ impacts on public services: No systematic data and analysis
There is considerable anecdotal evidence but very limited systematic data and analysis about the extent of migrants’ 
use of public services, especially health and education, and even less information about the value of migrants’ 
contributions to the provision of public services.  
8) Impacts on housing: Little systematic research evidence
Much of the evidence base on immigration and housing in the UK relates to the housing choices and housing 
conditions of migrants. We know much less about how immigration impacts, directly and indirectly, on house prices, 
rents, and social housing at national and local levels.  
9) Student migration: Uncertainty about numbers and compliance and limited analysis of impacts
Student migration has become the focus of policy debate, but the evidence base lacks sufficient information about 
the number of students, the extent of non-compliance with immigration rules among international students, and the 
impact of foreign students on the broader economy and society.
10) Irregular (illegal) migrants: We know little about their numbers, characteristics and impacts
Irregular migrants in the UK are likely to have important impacts on, for example, labour markets, the provision of 
public services, government finances and social cohesion.  Yet, as it is the case in many but not all other immigration 
countries, the data and information about the number, characteristics and impacts of irregular migrants are 
extremely limited. 
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1) Emigration: The only source of information is a survey
In order to estimate the level of net-migration, one needs information on both the inflows (immigration) and 
outflows (emigration) of migrants. Data on emigration is particularly scarce.  The International Passenger Survey 
(IPS) conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) is the only source of emigration data, and is used in 
ONS estimates of net-migration.  Since these estimates are the official statistics targeted by government policy, 
limitations on this data source are a matter of critical policy importance.
There has been considerable debate about the accuracy of IPS measures of total emigration, and there is no reliable 
alternative source of data against which to check its results.  The IPS does not count all entries and exits, but rather 
interviews a sample of international passengers.  It now interviews about 2000 or more emigrants annually, though 
prior to improvements in 2007 its emigration estimates were based on less than one thousand annual interviews.  
Like any survey, IPS comes with inherent uncertainty: it can only produce estimates with margins of error rather 
than pinpoint numbers.  In 2009, IPS estimated 337,500 emigrants, but, considering its margin of error, this only 
means that we can be 95% confident that the real level of emigration was between 315,800 and 359,100, a range 
of over 43,000 (see Figure 1 below).  Official net-migration figures are therefore only estimates as well, and subject 
to margins of error from both the inflow and outflow estimates.
In addition to margins of error, surveys also face biases that may come from numerous sources, including people 
refusing to be interviewed and obstacles to obtaining a truly random sample.  Thus, IPS estimates depend on a series 
of calculations of “weights” designed to extrapolate from a few thousand survey interviews to a larger population. 
  
Also, IPS identification of emigrants depends on people’s self-reported intentions about for how long they plan to 
leave the UK, which may or may not materialize. This question is critical because only people departing for at least 
one year meet the official definition of a migrant.  The ONS attempts to adjust for people who change plans, but 
again there is no alternative source of information to help confirm whether its estimates of “switchers” are correct. 
 
Another important limitation is that IPS emigration data do not allow for calculation of net-migration by categories 
of migrants (e.g. workers, students, family migrants).  This is because when IPS collects information on migrants 
leaving the UK, it does not gather information about the characteristics and purpose of entry of these same 
migrants at the time of their initial arrival to the UK.  For instance, it is possible for someone to arrive as a foreign 
citizen, naturalise and then leave as a UK citizen. This would exaggerate the contributions of non-British nationals 
to net-migration, as the same individual would raise net-migration among foreign nationals upon arrival and reduce 
net-migration among British nationals upon departure.   In the same way, some migrants arrive in the UK for the 
purpose of formal study, but leave for employment elsewhere, exaggerating net-migration in the formal study 
category and taking away from net-migration in the work category.
Figure 1
Source: Office of National Statistics, 
confidence interval 95% 
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2) Immigration: Data sources differ on the numbers of migrants coming to the UK
Policies aimed at regulating the number of people coming to the UK face a fundamental uncertainty about the actual 
level of immigration.  The government collects data on “inflows” of migrants through three primary sources, which 
provide different estimates of total immigration (and by extension, of net-migration).
Official statistics on immigration (as well as net-migration) come from ONS’ estimates of Long-Term International 
Migration (LTIM), which are based on the International Passenger Survey (IPS). Home Office administrative data 
provide two more sources on immigration of non-EEA1 citizens:  entry clearance visas issued and passengers 
entering the UK through border control. (Visa and passenger entry immigration control data track only non-EEA/
Swiss citizens.)  These sources yield very different estimates of immigration to the UK.  As shown in Chart 1 below, 
LTIM estimates of immigration of non-EU citizens are significantly smaller than the number of visas issued or 
number of passengers entering the UK. 
There are some clear reasons why these sources diverge.  First, ONS’ LTIM data only measure immigrants who say 
when interviewed at the border that they intend to stay in the UK for at least 12 months. Home Office data on visas 
and passenger entries also include foreign citizens who expect to stay in the UK for less than a year, and therefore 
do not qualify as migrants by the ONS (and internationally-agreed) definition. Of course, length-of-stay can only 
be known with certainty at departure, since plans change and stays can be extended or reduced.  A second clear 
issue with visa data is that some unknown number of people granted a visa never actually come to the UK.  On the 
other hand, LTIM data is based on a sample survey and are therefore only estimates, whereas visa data are accurate 
counts of the actual number of visas issued to non-EEA citizens.
Unfortunately, there is no reliable way to identify non-arrivals and short-term migrants from administrative data 
sources to see if the discrepancies between visas and LTIM data disappear.  As a result, it is unknown whether 
the above factors are sufficient to explain the differences completely, or if there are other unknown flaws or 
discrepancies. Recent ONS estimates of short-term migration (of three to twelve month stays) suggest that short-
term migration accounts for some the gap between LTIM and administrative data on visas and passenger entries, 
but may not do so completely.
    Figure 2
Sources: Office of National Statistics (LTIM figures), Home Office (visas and entries). Notes: Passenger entry statistics omitted for 2010 
(not yet available) and 2007 (do not allow for exclusion of student visitors). The data on visas and passenger entries shown in this chart 
exclude student visitors and other visitors. 
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3) Net-migration: Different data sources suggest different figures 
Reducing net-migration is a key policy objective of the current Government.  It is therefore important to have good 
information about the level and changes of net-migration over time. The problem is that two major data sources for 
net-migration suggest different figures.  
The most common measure of net-migration uses Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates based on 
the International Passenger Survey (IPS) which aims to capture the flows of people entering and leaving the UK. An 
alternative data source that can be used to estimate  net-migration is the Annual Population Survey (APS) which 
includes data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and provides information about the stock of migrants in the UK. 
In theory, the annual changes in the stock of migrants in the UK should reflect the level of net-migration, i.e. the 
difference between migrants coming to and leaving the UK.
Figure 3 below shows that the estimates of net-migration of non-British citizens suggested by LTIM do not always 
coincide with changes in the stock of non-British citizens suggested by the APS. Estimates were somewhat close in 
2007, but differed in the other years, sometimes by more than 60,000. The dynamics of the measures also appear 
to be different, as the APS suggest a marked decrease in the growth of the stock of migrants from 2008 to 2009, 
while LTIM suggests that net-migration was relatively flat for 2009.
As these surveys were designed for different purposes, there are several reasons that could explain the differences. 
LTIM estimates define migrants as individuals coming to or leaving the UK for over one year, while the APS defines 
migrants by citizenship or place of birth. International students living in communal establishments are not part of 
the APS estimates. Asylum seekers and recent arrivals with highly mobile residential patterns are also likely to be 
under-represented in the APS estimates. Foreign nationals who obtain British citizenship will disappear from the 
APS estimate of the stock of foreign nationals in the UK. Finally, LTIM data rely on self-reporting intentions about 
intended length of stay in the UK (when entering) or abroad (when leaving). It is unknown to what extent these 
reasons explain the discrepancy between the net-migration figures based on the APS and LTIM. 
                Figure 3 – Comparison of LTIM and APS Estimates of Net-Migration of Non-British Citizens, 2005-2009 
                Source:  Annual Population Survey (APS) and Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates, ONS 
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4) The immigration status of migrants in the UK: No systematic data   
There is no data source with information about the immigration status of migrants in the UK. The most 
comprehensive source of data on the number and characteristics of migrants is the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
The LFS includes questions about citizenship, place of birth and time spent in the UK. It does not, however, contain 
information about whether a migrant has temporary or permanent residence status (“leave to remain”) in the UK.  
The LFS records neither the type of visa migrants used to enter the UK, nor their current immigration status (e.g. 
workers, students, family, asylum seekers, recognised refugees, etc.)
The absence of comprehensive information about migrants’ immigration status gives rise to at least three problems 
in public and policy debates. First and most fundamentally, we do not know the numbers and characteristics of 
migrants with different types of immigration status. Among the total stock of migrants in the UK, how many are 
currently on Tier 1 and 2 visas? How many have student visas and what share of migrants on student visas have 
taken up employment in the UK? How, if at all, do the personal characteristics, skills and labour market participation 
rates vary across migrants with different types of immigration status? We currently do not have the data to provide 
robust answers to these questions.      
      
A consequent second problem is that we do not know how different types of immigration status affect the 
economic and social outcomes of migrants in the UK. Each immigration status is associated with different rights and 
restrictions with regard to access to employment and the welfare state. For example, current Tier 1 migrants have 
the right to free choice of employment in the UK, while Tier 2 migrants are only allowed to work for the employer 
specified on the certificate of sponsorship (they can change employers but only after a new application). How does 
this employment restriction impact on Tier 2 migrants’ wages and behaviour in the labour market? Some migrants 
do not have full access to selected welfare benefits such as health care and education. How do these restrictions 
impact on migrants’  health and other outcomes? How do the wages and jobs of recognised refugees change over 
time? Do Tier 1 migrants, who were admitted without a job offer in the UK, work in occupations that are highly 
skilled? The lack of data prevents systematic analysis of these issues.   
The third problem is that we currently cannot systematically assess the impact of migrants with different types 
of immigration status on the UK labour market, economy and society. This issue becomes particularly problematic 
when Government is adjusting its immigration policies by fine tuning the admission and selection criteria for 
particular types of migrants (e.g. workers and students from outside the EU).   In the absence of data about 
migrants’ immigration status, any impact analysis of changing policies that target specific migrant groups must 
necessarily remain limited. 
 
REPORT:  Top Ten Problems in the Evidence Base for Public Debate and Policy-Making on Immigration in the UK
THE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY | WWW.MIGRATIONOBSERVATORY.OX.AC.UK PAGE 8
5) Local area statistics on migrants: The existing estimates are very imprecise
The efficient allocation of central government revenue to local councils and regions of the UK critically depends on 
accurate data about the size of the local population.  The size and composition of the local population can change 
rapidly due to changes in both internal and international migration in- and out-flows. The Census is the best source 
of demographic data for small geographical units but it happens only every ten years and thus becomes quickly out 
of date, especially during times of large migration flows. In the intercensal period, estimates from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and the Annual Population Survey (APS) provide the best measurement of the migrant population at 
the local level (e.g. the number of foreign born and foreign nationals).
The LFS and APS are national surveys that are not designed to yield precise estimates of the size and characteristics 
of the migrant population at the local level. As shown in Table 1 below, the confidence intervals of estimates of the 
number of migrants at the local level can be large and in some cases as large as the actual migration estimates. For 
instance, in East Devon the estimated number of foreign-born is 4,000 but the confidence interval (95%) ranges 
from 0 to 8,000. 
Other sources of information that have sometimes been used to estimate and discuss the number of migrants at 
the local level include National Insurance Number registrations, registrations with a GP of individuals previously 
living overseas (Flag 4 records), registrations in the Workers’ Registration Scheme (WRS) for A8 nationals, and the 
International Passenger Survey which records the intended first (but not the final) destination of migrants entering 
the UK.  Importantly, while giving some information about the new inflow of migrants into particular areas of 
the UK, these data are not designed to measure the stock of migrants at a particular point in time as they do not 
capture migrants who leave the area for another place in the UK or to move abroad. 
The significant uncertainty about the number of migrants in local areas creates significant difficulties for the planning 
and efficient delivery of public services and a whole range of other public policies. 
Table1: Estimates of the foreign-born population in selected Local Authorities, 
based on data from the Annual Population Survey for January-December 2009
95% Confidence Interval
Local Authority Foreign-Born Lower Bound Upper Bound
East Devon 4,000 0 8,000
Dover 5,000 1,000 9,000
Lancaster 9,000 3,000 15,000
Canterbury 14,000 7,000 21,000
Cardiff 37,000 28,000 46,000
Westminster 123,000 104,000 142,000
Manchester 111,000 96,000 126,000
Birmingham 220,000 192,000 248,000
Source: Office for National Statistics local area migration indicators.
REPORT:  Top Ten Problems in the Evidence Base for Public Debate and Policy-Making on Immigration in the UK REPORT:  Top Ten Problems in the Evidence Base for Public Debate and Policy-Making on Immigration in the UK
THE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY | WWW.MIGRATIONOBSERVATORY.OX.AC.UK PAGE 9
6) Public opinion: How does the public define the “immigrants” it wants reduced?
Current coalition government policy aims to reduce net-migration below 100,000 per year, in keeping with public 
opinion data showing that about ¾ of the British resident population would prefer to see less immigration.  But will a 
reduction in numbers address the public’s most urgent concerns?
Public opinion data clearly show that the majority of the British resident population would prefer reduced 
immigration. But the evidence base lacks detailed information on a crucial issue – how do members of the public 
define “immigrants?”  Survey questions about “immigration” or “immigrants” rarely define these terms, and certainly 
do not offer the government’s official definition.  When responding to poll questions about “immigration,” are 
most people thinking about foreign students, workers, or asylum seekers, for example?  Do members of the public 
distinguish between EU and non-EU nationals? Or between newly-arriving migrants and migrants already settled in 
the UK? And, further, is opposition to migration attached equally to all groups?
This matters because while our knowledge of public opinion is based on the implicit definitions of “immigrant” that 
members of the public use, government policies are directed toward “immigrants” as the government defines it 
(in keeping with UN standards).  But these definitions may diverge, such that some approaches to reducing net-
migration statistics might be poorly tailored to the actual sources of public concern.  In one striking example, the 
government definition differs from common language on the length of stay required to become a “long-term 
international migrant”.  The Oxford English Dictionary, a reflection of actual language use, defines an immigrant (in 
part) as “a person who migrates into a country as a settler.” This definition suggests a degree of permanence absent 
from the government definition, in which a twelve month stay is sufficient for status as a “long-term international 
migrant”. 
This definitional divergence has implications for policies aimed at particular types of migrants, such as students.   
International students, the majority of whom stay in the UK only temporarily, may not be commonly included in the 
notion of “immigrants” that animates opposition from the majority of the public.  (We simply do not know, from the 
existing evidence base on public opinion.)  But, if students do not fit common images of who counts as a migrant, 
then policies that reduce student immigration and go beyond the reduction of fraud and illegal overstaying of visas 
might do little to address the public’s concerns.  This does not deny the public’s preference for fewer migrants.  
Rather, the point is that public opinion may be focused on a set of people that meet a common-language definition 
of “immigrant,” rather than the set that qualify as immigrants in official government statistics on gross and net-
migration.
In addition, little polling addresses public attitudes toward the key policy categories of immigration, such as high-
skilled and low-skilled workers, students, and family migrants.  Public opinion might prefer fewer migrants, but also 
prefer to maintain or increase migration in some categories. Some evidence exists at the extremes – doctors and 
nurses are among the most popular migrants, illegal immigrants the least.  But a wide range of categories are seldom 
if ever discussed in opinion polls.
Finally, it is not clear from the evidence how many opponents of immigration would be satisfied with the 
government’s goal of reducing migration below 100,000.  Polls dating back to the 1960s have shown a widespread 
preference for less migration, even when overall numbers were much smaller than today’s. 
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7) Migrants’ impacts on public services: no systematic data and analysis
The impact of immigration on the use and provision of public services – such as health, education, social housing 
and social services – is one of the key issues at the heart of the UK’s immigration debate. There is considerable 
anecdotal evidence but very limited systematic data and analysis about migrants’ use of public services, especially 
health and education, and even less information about the value of migrants’ contributions to the provision of public 
services in the UK. While the rapid growth in immigration in recent years has clearly had important consequences for 
public services in the UK, we do not have robust estimates of these effects which can include costs (consumption) 
and benefits (provision).   
The lack of systematic evidence on migrants’ use of public services is mainly due to the fact that immigration status 
is recorded inconsistently (or not at all) when public services are provided. There is, for example, no systematic 
data on the number of migrants, let alone migrants with different types of immigration status, that make use of 
particular types of health services. We also have very limited information on the number of migrants’ children in 
UK school because enrolment data do not record nationality, country of birth, or immigration status. The closest 
estimates of migrant children in UK schools are based on data on the number of children receiving support for 
learning English as an Additional Language (EAL) at schools in England only. EAL status is self-reported and is an 
indicator of when English is not the first language spoken at home. It thus includes children born in the UK but who 
do not speak English at home. It also fails to capture children who are migrants but speak English at home. In the 
absence of systematic data and evidence, much of the debate is based on anecdotal evidence provided by service 
providers and other stakeholders.
In addition to the taxes they pay, migrants contribute to the provision of public services in at least two specific ways 
that have not yet been analysed adequately. First, they can provide skills that are currently not available or in short 
supply in the UK. Second, the employment of migrants facilitates the provision of public services at a cost that is 
lower than would be the case if those services were dependent solely on the supply of British workers. Immigration 
is thus a form of “subsidy” to public services that benefits service providers, consumers and the taxpayer. Potential 
adverse impacts of this subsidy include downward pressures on wages (or at least wage growth) of British workers 
employed in public services. They also include, in some low-waged sectors such as social care, an increasing reliance 
on and entrenchment of low-cost service provision. Although we have data on the numbers and employment share 
of migrants in specific areas of service provision – e.g. LFS data suggest that almost a third of health professionals in 
the UK, and two-thirds of care assistants in London are foreign born – there has been no systematic analysis of how 
the employment of migrants has affected wages, and the cost and structure of public service provision. 
Lack of data and analysis about the impacts of immigration on the use and provision of public services has important 
effects on studies of the fiscal effects of immigration. They typically ignore the contribution migrants make to the 
provision of public services and assume that migrants’ use of public services is the same as that of British nationals. 
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8) Impact on Housing: little systematic evidence of direct and indirect impacts of 
immigration on house prices, rents and social housing at national and local levels
Much of the research evidence base on immigration and housing in the UK relates to the housing choices and 
housing conditions of migrants. Quantitative studies of this issue generally use the UK’s Labour Force Survey 
which contains information about the housing choices (e.g. renting private accommodation, home ownership, 
social housing) of migrants and UK-born individuals. We know, for example, that foreign-born persons have lower 
ownership rates than the UK-born and greater representation in the rental sector. 
We also know that migration is the most important variant in projections about the growth of the number of 
households in England. The principal estimate in the latest analysis by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government assumes that net-migration accounts for just under 40 percent of the annual increase in households in 
England (252,000 new households per year) to 2031.2 
There is, however, much less research evidence on the ways immigration directly and indirectly impacts house 
prices, rents, and social housing at national and local levels.  Positive net-migration leads to an increase in the 
demand for housing which can impact on house prices and rents. The magnitude of these impacts critically depends 
on the responsiveness of the supply of housing to changes in demand. The impact of immigration on housing can 
also be expected to vary across local areas with different housing markets and experiencing different scales of 
migrant inflows and outflows. There can also be important inter-relationships between the owner occupier sector 
and the private rented sector. For example, the increased demand for rented accommodation may encourage more 
investors to enter the buy-to-let market, which in turn could increase house prices.  There is little systematic 
research evidence on any of these issues in the UK. 
There is more but still limited evidence on social housing. We know, for example, that recent migrants are less 
likely than the UK-born population to be accommodated in the social housing sector, but that the propensity of 
migrants to be in social housing increases over time (most likely because migrants acquire access to social housing 
over time).3 But there has been no research about the indirect effects of immigration on social housing that arise 
from the relationships between social housing and the private housing market. Even if migrants themselves do not 
use social housing, immigration may still change the demand for social housing indirectly by driving up rents and 
house prices in the private sector and making more people dependent on social housing. The costs of social housing 
provision may also increase because of increased competition for properties from the private rented sector.4  There 
has been no systematic research of these issues in the UK. 
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9) Student migration: uncertainty about numbers and compliance and limited analysis of 
impacts
Student migration has become the focus of policy debate, generating some new information in the process. But the 
evidence base still lacks sufficient information about the number of students, the extent of non-compliance with 
immigration rules among international students, and the impact of foreign students on the broader economy and 
society.
One critical aspect of the debate on student migration is the contribution of students to net-migration over the 
long term.  Net-migration is difficult to estimate for other categories of migrants as well, because of limitations 
on exit data.  In the case of international students, there is a particular concern about those who overstay their 
temporary student visas, thus adding to net-migration in the long run while also adding to the non-compliant 
migrant population.
Home Office data (from a study of all non-European students arriving in the year 2004) show that after five years, 
approximately 80% of non-European students no longer have legal permission to remain in the UK.5  What is missing 
is definitive information on how many of that 80% actually leave the country and how many “overstay” their visas 
and remain in the UK without legal permission.  
A 2010 Home Office report on student migration included an analysis of international students’ compliance, but 
the information is incomplete and not necessarily representative.6 As noted in the report, this analysis was based 
on a sample of institutions chosen not at random, but for “convenience.”  More specifically, the study examined 
universities on the government’s Highly Trusted Sponsors list, while using data on other types of educational 
students from a list of those that had been subject to an investigation because of suspicions about its legitimacy.  
These convenience samples seem likely to lead to underestimating potential non-compliance rates for university 
students while inflating potential non-compliance rates for other institutions.
Moreover, the data do not show actual overstaying but only the “potentially non-compliant”—those for whom there 
is no record of leaving the UK or of valid extension of their stay.  Estimates of exits are based on the still-incomplete 
eBorders system of monitoring entries and exits.
The impact of foreign students on the higher education sector, and on the broader economy, is a second area in 
which key information is lacking.  The economic impact of international students higher education is relatively well-
documented, but similar information on further education and English language schools is in short supply.  There is 
also a commonly-held view among educators that international students have valuable non-economic benefits on 
the quality of education that students receive and the quality of research conducted at universities, particularly in 
the STEM fields.  These benefits are inherently more difficult to study quantitatively, and so they may drop out of 
the evidence base.
An additional question about international students is their impact on the job prospects of British graduates. In 
particular, does the Post-Study Work Route (PSWR), which allowed some 38,000 international students to stay 
on in Britain for up to two years after graduation, create problems for job-hunting British graduates?  The labour 
market effects of the PSWR have not been thoroughly analysed, although the question is particularly important at 
present, with unemployment rates for graduates still unusually high.
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10) Irregular (illegal) migrants: we know little about their numbers, characteristics and 
impacts
Irregular migrants are likely to have important impacts on, for example, labour markets, the provision of public 
services, government finances and social cohesion.  Yet, as it is the case in many but not all other immigration 
countries, the data and information about the number, characteristics and impacts of irregular migrants are 
extremely limited. Irregular migration is by definition not recorded and eludes statistical coverage. Therefore, precise 
measurement is unfeasible. 
The most recent estimate of the number of irregular migrants and their UK-born children suggests a range of 
524,000 to 947,000 (central estimate 725,000) at the end of 2007.7 This estimate is based on an update of the 
analysis in a Home Office report published in 2005.8 In addition to the large range (423,000), the methodology 
underlying this estimate has a series of limitations, which are explicitly mentioned in these two studies.
The original Home Office report used a ‘residual method’ to estimate the number of irregular migrants in the UK 
in April 2001. This involved deducting an estimate of the legally residing foreign-born population from the total 
number foreign-born actually recorded in the UK Census in 2001. The difference (or the ‘residual’) is an estimate of 
the number of irregular migrants present in 2001. The residual method thus combines census data for measuring 
the total foreign-born population with a range of surveys and administrative data to estimate the legally resident 
population. 
A key problem with this method is that the survey data used to help estimate the legally resident population are 
subject to sampling variability and it is likely that some groups are under- or over-represented.  For example, 
emigration figures of different groups of migrants were based on data from the International Passenger Survey and 
variations in these estimates may affect the estimated irregular population significantly. Other difficulties relate to 
problems with defining certain groups of migrants. 
Furthermore, by defining irregular migrants based on the absence of legal residence status in the UK, the available 
estimates of irregular migrants in the UK exclude migrants who are residing legally but working illegally. Whether and 
to what extent legally resident migrants who are violating restrictions of their residence permit should be included 
in the population of irregular migrants is subject to debate. It is not known how many legally resident migrants in the 
UK are currently violating the conditions of their stay including any employment restrictions or restrictions on access 
to welfare benefits. For example, it is not known how many non-EU migrants who are legally residing on student 
visas are working in excess of the legally allowed 20 hours per week during term time. Evidence from research using 
non-random samples suggests that the incidence of this kind of “semi-compliance” may not be insignificant.9 
Partly as a consequence of the uncertainty about the number of irregular migrants, we also have very little 
systematic information about their composition (e.g. gender, nationality, age structure, length of stay) and how it 
differs from the legally resident migrant population. We do not have systematic data and analysis of where irregular 
migrants work, and how they impact on, for example, the labour market, housing and public services. There is also 
limited analysis of how precisely illegal status affects the employment and lives of irregular migrants themselves.
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